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Few prior studies investigated a further link between ownership structure and 
firm performance in terms of post Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998 and 
explored the impact of the corporate governance recovery program. Using an 
agency framework, this research argued that the distribution of equity ownership 
among top managers and external block holders had a significant relationship 
with leverage and firm performance, and there was reverse causality effect 
between ownership structure, capital structure, and firm performance. The paper 
tested five hypotheses and used 532 East Asian companies’ financial data in 
2000-2001 (a starting period of the recovery program) of seven most affected 
countries. Based on statistical analysis, the study revealed the positive impacts 
of corporate governance recovery indicated by an increasing of cost efficiency in 
monitoring and controlling the management. It also supported the managerial 
ownership as one way to reduce conflict of interest between shareholder and 
manager and increase firm value.  
 




The Asian economic crisis has exposed critical deficiencies in financial systems 
throughout Asia and has also highlighted the problem of corporate governance among 
South East Asian companies. The principal focus of post-crisis research has attempted to 
link these deficiencies to specific causes such as over-leveraged domestic financial 
markets, overexposure to foreign exchange risks and monopolistic market structures. 
Underlying all these issues are a fundamental lack of control. Poor corporate governance 
is indicative of this problem. Indeed, corporate governance provides at least as convincing 
an explanation … as any or all the usual macroeconomic arguments.  
 
Relating to this issue, the recent study commissioned by the Asian Development Bank 
(2000) reports that ownership structure determines the governance problem. It explains 
that the two key features of corporate ownership structure are concentration and 
composition. First, Asian firms are perceived to be highly concentrated, family-dominated 
corporations. It is possible to determine the nature of the agency problem by the degree of 
dispersion between management and ownership. High dispersion (low concentration) 
occurs when a large number of individuals, which are minority shareholders, hold the 
majority of ownership. The problem then is that between management and minority 
shareholders. Low dispersion (high concentration) is the condition of the majority of 
ownership that is controlled by a small number of large shareholders. The problem then is 
between majority and minority shareholders. 
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The second part of ownership structure is its composition. Ownership composition 
essentially means who owns the corporation—who the shareholders are. Examples of 
shareholders include individuals, a family or family group, a holding company, a bank, an 
institutional investor or a non-financial corporation (ADB 2000, p. 7). Importantly, for 
governance, it must be determined if any owners form a controlling group(s).  
 
On the other side, the Asian Crisis itself has supported previous theoretical and applied 
literature that has highlighted the complex nature of the relationship between ownership 
structure, capital structure, and firm performance. Existing literature highlights the agency 
problems between managers and shareholders. In an attempt to ensure the continued 
viability of the firm, the latter may result in a generally lower leverage ratio below the 
optimum level.  
 
Meanwhile, recent studies about ownership, capital structure, and firm performance that 
are done in East Asia countries mainly focus on the period pre-crisis. There are such as 
Claessens, Djankov & Lang (2000) examine the pattern of ownership in seven East Asian 
countries, Claessens et al. (2002) investigate the effect of large shareholding on firm 
valuation, and Lemmon and Lins (2003) further link ownership structure to stock returns in 
these countries. None of these recent studies, however, considers the effect of ownership 
structure on capital structure and firm performance and the possible interaction between 
capital structure and firm performance. In other words, a clear understanding of the effects 
of ownership structure on capital structure and firm performance remains much 
unexplored, especially an analysis of the post-crisis period. 
 
This condition, of course, triggers a curiosity about the effect of Asian Financial Crisis to 
the company performance, especially how the Asian companies react to it, in terms of 
improving their corporate governance practices. Research that concerned about 
ownership structure, capital structure, and firm performance of East Asian countries, which 
are affected by the crisis, is one of the research efforts in topic ―corporate governance," in 
terms of post-crisis analysis. This research constituted former investigations in topic 
corporate governance, which many results of immeasurable empirical findings had 
revealedhow a certain event (e.g. crisis, economic recession, or shock) could make a 
decisive change. 
 
This paper is organized in the following manner. First, the literature review section 
provides background on the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance, including the current and inconclusive results of the impact of ownership 
structure and firm performance that underline the causes of the Asian Financial Crisis and 
the need to recover corporate governance practices. Research hypotheses are 
subsequently proposed regarding the companies‘ practices of managing leverage and 
distributing managerial ownership for the period 2000-2001. The methodology and model, 
including discussion of sampling frame and measures, are afterwards discussed. Eleven 
variables are analyzed in a multivariate regression analysis, and the results of t-test of 
each independent variable are provided. Finally, implications for corporate governance 
and ownership structure management, and future research on good corporate governance 
related to the comparison of several post crisis periods are presented. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Prior empirical findings have shown that the impact of ownership on firm performance is 
twofold. On the one hand, concentrated ownership can provide for better control of 
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management, as size of ownership stake and the incentive to monitor are positively 
correlated. In turn, it should improve firm performance and equally benefit minority 
shareholders. On the other hand, it can come with costs for minority shareholders as the 
controlling owners might try to expropriate from them. This is one of a number of private 
control benefits enjoyed by large block holders at the expense of firm value. A number of 
surveys have attempted to measure these at the country level. For example, Nenova 
(2000) documents differing levels of private control benefits across a large cross-section of 
countries reflected in premiums paid for voting shares. Dyck and Zingales (2004) 
document similar control premia paid in European block trades. Bebchuk (1999) argues 
that it is rational for block holders to grab these private control benefits before managers 
do. 
 
The existing literature is split concerning the effect of ownership on performance. Bebchuk 
and Fried (2003) and Roe (2003) argue that what, at face value, appear to be inefficient 
ownership structures (whether are dispersed or concentrated), are, in fact, efficient in the 
context of their institutional environment. Coffee (1999) argues that the current ownership 
arrangements are more a ―product of a path-dependent history than the ‗neutral‘ result of 
an inevitable evolution toward greater efficiency.‖ If this second proposition is correct, then 
the predominant ownership structure might not necessarily be the best performing one. 
 
Thomsen, Pedersen & Kvis (2003) who showed that block holders might destroy corporate 
value when studying companies in the largest continental European countries confirm this 
suspicion. Nevertheless, all the above evidence clearly implies that the ownership 
structures matter for firm performance, whether positively or negatively.  
 
Acemoglu (1999) has pointed out that the long-run equilibrium of economic institutions is 
often sub-optimal. In his research, reform of institutional arrangements, within which it 
includes corporate control and governance arrangements, might imply a possible loss to 
groups that currently hold power. It is argued that as these groups cannot be credibly 
compensated ex-post for their loss of power, they have an incentive to block change. The 
implication is that ownership structures might not adjust perfectly to changes in economic 
conditions or the needs of the firm. This view would predict that we would see inefficient 
ownership structures persist over time. As Zingales and Rajan (2003, p. 2) state, ―financial 
systems do not .... emerge simply as a result of their superiority in a particular 
environment. The power of vested interest distorts the process of evolution."  
 
These findings are in clear contradictions to Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and the research of 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). They argue that an optimal ownership structure is 
achieved through private contracting between shareholders and management based on 
the value maximization principle. The financing costs of a concentrated ownership 
increase with firm size because families, and other controlling investors, cannot diversify 
their portfolio. Therefore, a firm has a natural incentive to move to a more diffuse 
ownership structure, and we should observe an optimal ownership structure where the 
benefits of control and financing are at equilibrium. Consequently, they argue that no 
relation between the two variables can be detectable, and empirically found no relationship 
between ownership structure and performance for a sample of US firms between 1976 and 
1980. 
 
Reflecting to the Holderness‘s investigation (2003), in a reverse-causation problem, the 
real causation runs in the opposite direction of the assumed one. This might yield 
significant results, but it gives a wrong picture of the relation. An effect may not only run 
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the other direction than assumed yielding a reverse-causation problem, but there may be 
even a multidirectional causation. The resulting endogeneity or simultaneous equations 
bias is very likely to exist in analyses of ownership and performance. As theory contains 
effects for both directions, from ownership on performance and vice versa, it supports the 
assumption of synchronous reciprocal determination of ownership and performance. 
Although the endogeneity model was already addressed by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and 
is widely accepted by researchers, it is rarely modeled in empirical studies. 
 
Since it is limited and until now, the author knows only six studies that model ownership 
and performance simultaneously. Therefore, the ignorance of an existing endogeneity bias 
has resulted in inconsistent estimates and confused directions of causation. The results of 
these six studies partly differ drastically from those of studies without modeled 
endogeneity. Consequently, the consideration of the simultaneous causation estimated by 
the simultaneous equations method is seen as the main advantage of this study. 
 
Like Cho (1998) who has extended the argument of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) by 
examining the interdependence of managerial ownership, investment, and corporate 
value, in this study, we tried to develop the parallel causation of the ownership-
performance relationship. In Cho's study (1998), drawing on Demsetz and Lehn (1985), 
simultaneous regression analysis was utilized to control for the endogeneity bias, and Cho 
found that ownership structure was endogenously determined by firm value (as measured 
by Tobin's Q). The study also reported that investment and not managerial ownership 
significantly influenced the corporate value. Cho (1998) concluded that managers in firms 
with higher Tobin's Q, or with the better-investment opportunities tend to hold a bigger 
fraction of their firm's shares. However, he found no evidence that managerial ownership 
had a causal effect on investment or corporate value. 
 
In the light of finding new evidence in simultaneous causation, the same consideration 
could be applied in the two-way relationship between ownership structure and firm value. 
Thus, one needs to allow for the simultaneity test between ownership structure and firm 
performance. 
 
This leads to the first, second, third and fourth hypothesis: 
 
H1: Firms with a higher level of external block holdings and a higher debt ratio are likely to 
have higher firm performance, ceteris paribus. 
 
H2: Firms with low levels of managerial share ownership and higher debt are likely to have 
a higher firm performance, ceteris paribus. 
 
H3: Companies with higher firm performance and higher debt are likely to have a higher 
level of external block holdings, ceteris paribus. 
 
H4: Companies with higher firm performance and higher debt are likely to have low levels 
of managerial share ownership, ceteris paribus. 
 
The effect of general ownership concentration on performance is unclear due to the 
contradicting hypotheses. That is, while the concentration could lead to a better-monitoring 
management and consequently, to a better performance, it could also trigger managerial 
de-motivation with a negative effect on performance. Furthermore, the block holder could 
use control to consume private benefits at the expense of other shareholders and firm 
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performance. However, performance can also determine ownership concentration. Large 
shareholders use their better company knowledge to increase their share if they assume 
good performance or to sell it in the case of a bad firm‘s prospect. 
 
For the effect of insider ownership on performance, two contradicting arguments exist. 
While the managerial ownership aligns the managers‘ incentive with shareholders‘ interest, 
it can also entrench the management against controlling and sanctioning actions. The 
divergence of control and cash flow rights has a negative effect on performance, since the 
cash flow rights form opportunity costs of opportunistic behavior and benefits for 
shareholder-value-oriented actions.  
 
The effect of performance on insider ownership is assumed, if existent, as positive. The 
first argument is that shareholders try to use managerial stock ownership or option plans 
as incentive alignment; thus, they reward the management for good performance with 
stocks. Second, the management of well performing companies favors stock remuneration 
and is more likely to accept or to promote those compensation designs. Finally, the 
managers use their insider knowledge to perform legal forms of insider trading. They 
increase their share if the company is perceived as well performing and reduce it in the 
case of bad firm prospects. 
 
In order to see the simultaneity of combined effect of ownership concentration and insider 
ownership on performance, it is arranged another hypothesis that leads to the fifth 
hypothesis. Therefore, the test of those combined effects on performance will be done as 
well as the test of capital structure effect on performance. 
 
H5: Firms with a higher level of external block holdings, low levels of managerial share 
ownership and a higher debt ratio are likely to have higher firm performance, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
This hypothesis is intended to analyze whether both levels of external block holding and 
managerial share ownership influence the firm performance or not. A simultaneous 
equations model assuming the performance as well as the different ownership forms as 
exogenous allows the consideration of ownership interactions and the clear separation of 
their effects on performance. 
 
3. Methodology and Model 
 
Two research models are developed to test five hypotheses. Since the underlying 
hypothesis is that firm performance is a function of the distribution of equity ownership 
among managers and external block holders, the company performance is regressed on 
some measures of ownership structure (and other control) variables. In the first analysis, 
the relation of each ownership measure and performance separately, the model is 
decomposed in two groups that contain eight equations systems A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H 
as demonstrated in Table 2 until Table 5. The first model (with four equation systems: A, 
B, C, and D) elaborates on ownership concentration; and the second model focuses on 
managerial ownership (with four equation systems: E, F, G, and H). 
 
Each model contains the relation of performance to one of the ownership forms and thus 
includes two equations, one covering the effects of the ownership aspect on performance 
and a second with performance determining ownership. In addition, leverage (debt ratio) is 
included in the ownership equations to reflect the possibility that creditors can act as 
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external monitors, which might affect the likelihood of observing ownership structures that 
facilitate managerial entrenchment. 
 
To proxy the firm performance, it is used Tobin‘s Q, which its approximation is developed 
by Chung and Pruitt (1994), and ROE (return on equity), as it can be seen below: 
 
QCP = 
MVEt + PSt + BVINVt + LTDEBTt + CLt - CAt 
TAt 
 
where QCP = Tobin‘s Q estimate by Chung/Pruitt (1994), 
MVE = year-end value of common stock, 
PS = liquidation value of preferred stock, 
BVINV = year-end book value of inventories, 
LTDEBT = year-end book value of long-term debt, 
CL = year-end book value of current liabilities, 
CA = year-end book value of current assets, and 
TA = book value of total assets. 
 
The liquidation value of preferred stock is used due to difficulties in obtaining price quotes 
for preferred stock. It can be calculated by aggregating the preferred stock market value 
and dividing it by Standard & Poor‘s preferred stock yield index. Meanwhile, the 
accounting-based performance measures most common in the ownership literature are 
return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA).  They are defined as: 
 
ROE = 




Earnings before interest expenses and taxes 
Total assets 
 
The ROE measures only the return on assets of the equity owners, whereas the ROA 
aggregates the return of equity-holders and debt-holders. Prior studies were in favor for a 
preference of ROE over ROA in equity ownership and performance literature. However, in 
this study, ROE is considered as a better proxy of the financial performance and its effect 
on ownership. 
 
In addition, by modifying and adapting the work of Brailsford, Oliver &Pua (2002), debt to 
equity ratio is used to see the effect of leverage on firm performance and ownership 
structure. 
 
Ln (D/E) =  natural log transformation of Debt/Equity ratio 
EBO = percentage of ordinary shares held by the larger shareholders. Data for the 
top two, five, and 20 external shareholders are used as the proxy for 
external block ownership.  
MSO = percentage of ordinary shares owned by all executive and non-executive 
directors. Morck, Shleifer & Vishny (1988) and Keasey, Short & Watson 
(1994) use share ownership of corporate directors, amongst others to proxy 
for managerial share ownership. 
 
The two variables used to control for risk are [1] SIZE = natural log (total assets). Many 
studies suggest that firm size is one important factor, which affects a firm‘s debt policy and 
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therefore,risks, and [2] IND = zero-one dummy variable for industry classification, where 
IND = 1 if industrial company and IND = 0 if natural resources company.  
 
The three variables used to control for agency costs are growth, free cash flow, and 
profitability. First, the study defined GROWTH = the annual percentage change in total 
assets. Titman and Wessels (1988) suggest that a firm‘s growth opportunities are a good 
proxy for the agency costs of debt, observing the ―pecking order‖ theory (Myers & Majluf, 
1984), and the agency relationship (McConnell & Servaes, 1995). Second, FCF is a direct 
measure of Jensen‘s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis predicting that firms with excessive 
free cash flow are likely to have higher leverage. FCF is defined in a similar manner to 
Lehn and Poulsen (1989), as follows, FCF = OYBT + DEP + AMO - TAXPAID – DIVPAID, 
where: 
 
OYBT =  operating income before income tax 
DEP =  depreciation expense 
AMO =  amortization separately reported, such as goodwill  
TAXPAID =  total tax paid  
DIVPAID =  total dividends paid 
 
Third, PROF = operating income before interest and taxes scaled by total assets. 
Indicators of a firm‘s profitability include ratios of operating income over sales and 
operating income over total assets and ratios of average earnings before interest and 
taxes over total assets.  
 
Meanwhile, the other two control variables are the asset specificity and the effect of taxes. 
First, we used intangible asset and defined INTA = Total Intangibles / Total Assets. 
Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) argue that asset specificity creates problems for debt 
financing due to the non-redeploy ability characteristics of specific assets. Second, to 
control for the effect of taxes, this study used non-debt tax shields (NDTS) = Annual 
Depreciation Expenses / Total Assets, which was put forward by DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980).  
 
The countries studied in this study were Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, the seven countries that were involved in the East 
Asian Financial crisis. Although other East Asian countries (and other emerging markets 
outside Asia) were affected by the crisis, the five of those seven countries considered here 
suffered disproportionately in terms of stock market decline and currency depreciation (see 
Figure 1). 
 
The reason for choosing the time horizon 2000 - 2001 was mainly that the period of post-
2000 was believed as the period of recovery of the crisis. The research chose to 2-years 
observation due to the fact and intention to portrait the post Asian Financial Crisis 
environment. In addition, the two-consecutive years' observation was hoped to be able to 
give enough information of the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance at the time of emerging East Asian Capital Market. 
 
The research considered the population of the study to be all non-regulated firms. The 
involved companies are listed on the stock market within one of East Asian Capital Market, 
such as Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX – Indonesia), SET (Bangkok - Thailand), KLSE 
(Kuala Lumpur - Malaysia), KRX (Seoul - Korea), PSE (Manila - Philippines), SEHK (Hong 
Kong), and TSEC (Taipei – Taiwan), and the time period chosen. 
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Figure 1: East Asian Stock Market Indices during the Financial Crisis 
 
 
Source: Mitton (2002) 
 
Due to the different facts arguing for simultaneity of ownership and performance 
relationship, this study took the challenge to test that endogeneity, and incorporated it in 
the resulting model. Furthermore, this study explored this new model in order to give more 
information on the relationship between performance and ownership, and try to avoid the 
simultaneity bias happened in prior studies. This proposed model will give different angles, 
especially, of the substitution effect of agency devices proposed by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Jensen (1986) that argued for an interdependence of the ownership aspects, 




As first ownership aspect, general ownership concentration, i.e. the existence and strength 
of a controlling shareholder, was analyzed. In this section, to test the effect of firm 
performance on capital structure, the regression models using return on equity (ROE) 
were excluded from the analysis. It was because the ROE measure did not have any 
significant variable in the estimation, due to the very small and insignificant of F-Value 
(0.315) and R-Square (0.086). These results made Tobin‘s Q the most powerful measures 
of performance in the East Asian countries' case. Therefore, the discussion will 
concentrate on this measure of performance besides the other control variables. 
 
In this study, the available populations were 1632 companies, and the used samples were 
532 companies. South Korea and Malaysia were dominant in the sample used. It means 
the companies in those countries had a complete financial data, or in the other words, the 
company could survive during the crisis, and report all their financial data to the stock 
market administrator. It intuitively informed us the picture of their economy during and after 
the Asia Financial crisis period. At the peak of the crisis period, nearly of East Asian 
companies should close their business, and some of them should be sold and restructured 
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as a part of agreement with the IMF financial support.  In the other side, the data in Table 
1 revealed that Hong Kong and Indonesia were the most suffered countries during the 
crisis.  
 





countries HK IND SK MY PH TW TH 
Financial 
Statistics 
        Total Assets* 8,390 3,552 247 1,598 344 560 1,598 492 
Maximum 
 
80,641 2,640 51,738 3,493 3,045 11,011 5,542 
Minimum 
 
46 9 9 12 51 67 12 
Median 
 
258 94 248 158 217 545 182 
Debt Ratio 0.51 0.54 0.70 0.47 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.52 
     Maximum 
 
1.41 1.76 4.54 3.20 0.88 1.01 1.29 
     Minimum 
 
0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 
Ownership 
Structure 
        External Block  
0.56 0.56 0.63 0.30 0.54 0.87 0.39 0.65 
Ownership 
     Maximum 
 
0.91 0.97 0.95 0.90 1.00 0.87 0.99 
     Minimum 
 
0.14 0.10 0.00 0.08 0.37 0.00 5.33 
Managerial  
0.09 0.11 0.01 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.22 0.08 
Ownership 
     Maximum 
 
0.61 0.17 0.52 0.64 0.07 0.84 59.77 
     Minimum 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sample 
Inclusion 
        No. of firms in  
1633 179 139 486 318 73 86 106 
Worldscope 
No. of firms for  
532 32 39 232 139 25 19 46 
final sample 
Note: * in million USD, HK: Hong Kong; IND: Indonesia; SK: South Korea; MY:Malaysia; PH: Philippines 
           TW: Taiwan; TH: Thailand 
 
Table 2 revealed a positively and significantly relation between EBO and Tobin‘s Q, and it 
could be interpreted that the East Asian companies' large owners are more capable of 
monitoring and controlling the management, thereby contributing to corporate 
performance. It means that ownership concentration has been able to increase the cost-
efficiency of monitoring in the post-crisis period and due to this higher incentive has 
enhanced its usage. This result is consistent with the monitoring model that is theoretically 
proven by the models of Grossman (1976), Grossman and Hart (1980), Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) and others as Bolton and von Thadden (1998), Burkart, Gromb & Panunzi. 
(1997), Huddart (1993), Leech (2001), and Maug (1998). Therefore, the result supported 
the first hypothesis. 
 
Regarding the control variables, most of the variables‘ coefficients are not significant, 
except the debt ratio that supports the first hypothesis and NDTS. A positively and 
significantly relation between leverage and firm performance means that the argument of 
reduced agency costs by Kim and Sorensen (1986) and Jensen (1986) prevails over the 
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pecking order argument by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Jensen, Solberg & Zorn(1992). 
According to the tax substitution theory, an increase in a firm‘s non-debt tax shield should 
be associated with decrease in debt (Hughes & Trezevant 1997).  
 
Table 2: The Effect of External Block Holder Ownership on  
Firm Performance Measures 
Model I – A & B (Tobin’s Q and ROE as Dependent Variables) 
 









Constant -1.134 -5.015 .000 Constant .055 .073 .942 
D/E .063 1.679*** .094 D/E -.001 -.012 .991 
EBO .625 3.392* .001 EBO .118 .192 .848 
D(EBO) .081 .754 .451 D(EBO) .031 .087 .931 
SIZE -.041 -1.366 .172 SIZE .047 .467 .640 
Industry .057 .646 .519 Industry -.212 -.714 .475 
GrowthTA -4.34E-005 -.068 .946 GrowthTA 9.20E-005 .043 .966 
PROF .173 .492 .623 PROF -1.620 -1.384 .167 
FCF -4.31E-005 -.280 .779 FCF 2.02E-005 .039 .969 
INTA .773 1.348 .178 INTA -.913 -.478 .633 
NDTS 7.694 5.577
* 
.000 NDTS -.084 -.018 .985 
F – Value 5.249* F – Value 0.315 
R Square 0.492 R Square 0.086 
* p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.10 
 
After assessing the effect of external block holder ownership, the next analysis is to 
measure the effect of managerial share ownership on firm performance. Comparing the 
results of Tobin‘s Q and ROE as the company performance (dependent variables), Tobin‘s 
Q was a more dominant measure than ROE, in context of performance in the East Asian 
countries. 
 
A negatively and significantly influence of managerial ownership at low-level supports the 
entrenchment argument. It confirms that managerial ownership at low-level has a strong 
and negative effect on performance and hence should not be promoted as the agency 
device. This result proved the second hypothesis. Meanwhile, a positively and significantly 
influence of managerial ownership at high-level supports the incentive alignment 
argument. It means that managerial ownership at high-level reduces the conflict of interest 
between shareholder and manager. These findings are consistent with Morck et al. 
(1998)‘s combined argument that suggests a non-monotonous relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance. 
 
This non-linear relationship is also consistent with previous studies, such as Short and 
Keasey (1999), McConnel and Servaes (1990), and Han and Suk (1998), which strongly 
confirm the existence of such a relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance. At low levels of ownership, management has the incentive to pursue the 
firm‘s value maximization activities. However, at high levels of ownership, self-serving 
behavior detrimental to the firm‘s value declines as management owns a higher fraction of 
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the firm‘s equity, and hence cannot externalize the costs of their moral hazard. 
Consequently, this result supports the fifth hypothesis. 
 
Meanwhile, the negative and significant effect of size for all companies in Model I (C & D) 
does not suit the hypotheses of Himmelberg, Hubbard & Palia (1999) and Gugler, Muller & 
Yurtoglu (2003) arguing for greater scope of moral hazard in large firms. An additional 
reason for a positive relation of size and insider ownership is that larger firms are likely to 
employ a more skilled and probably wealthier management. Thus, the wealth constraint 
argument is moderate.   
 
Table 3: The Effect of Managerial Share Ownership on Firm Performance Measures 
Model I – C & D (Tobin’s Q and ROE as Dependent Variables) 
 









Constant -.624 -3.014* .003 Constant .270 .392 .695 
D/E .085 2.278** .023 D/E .004 .035 .972 
MSO -2.113 -2.872* .004 MSO -1.604 -.656 .512 
MSO2 4.527 2.974* .003 MSO
2 
2.852 .564 .573 
SIZE -.056 -1.843*** .066 SIZE .035 .342 .733 
Industry .055 .621 .535 Industry -.202 -.683 .495 
GrowthTA .000 -.335 .738 GrowthTA .000 .059 .953 
PROF .077 .217 .828 PROF -1.619 -1.379 .168 
FCF -3.97E-005 -.258 .797 FCF 2.49E-005 .049 .961 
INTA .785 1.364 .173 INTA -1.014 -.530 .596 
NDTS 7.716 5.581* .000 NDTS -.090 -.020 .984 
F – Value 4. 973
*
 F – Value 0.355 
R Square 0.487 R Square 0.077 
* p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.10 
 
4.1 The reverse effect test: 
 
The reverse effects of Tobin‘s Q on the ownership variables are stated in Table 4(Model II 
– E & F) and Table 5 (Model II – G & H). A positively and significantly influence of Tobin‘s 
Q (independent variable) on EBO (dependent variable) can be interpreted that the East 
Asian companies' large owners are better informed than minority shareholders or potential 
investors; therefore, they use their knowledge about the firm‘s prospects to maximize his 
wealth. This result supported the third hypothesis and was in line with the profit-debt-
ownership argument (Demzetz & Lehn 1985). The result is also consistent with Grosfeld 
(2006) that found a positively and significantly relation between Tobin‘s Q with ownership 
concentration in privatized firms and new firms. Since leverage controls the agency 
conflicts between shareholders and managers, the need for external capital to mediate the 
conflict decreases. Consequently, performance decreases the leverage, which increases 
the ownership concentration. 
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Prior study of Lins (2003) showed the same result with this study (Table 4); that is, a 
positive relation between large non-management block holders and firm value could 
indicate that monitoring of managers by substantial external block holders has lessened 
actual or expected managerial agency problems. Conversely, it could be the case that high 
company values lead to the increased ownership by these block holders.        
 
Table 4: The Effect of Firm Performance Measures on  
External Block Holder Ownership (EBO) 











Constant .335 9.749 .000 Constant .307 9.466 .000 
D/E .026 3.094* .002 D/E .027 3.232* .001 
TOBIN Q .017 1.708*** .088 ROE -.001 -.238 .812 
SIZE .010 1.453 .147 SIZE .011 1.473 .141 
Industry -.018 -.906 .365 Industry -.018 -.914 .361 
GrowthTA .000 -2.334** .020 GrowthTA .000 -2.323** .021 
PROF -.095 -1.202 .230 PROF -.093 -1.182 .238 
FCF -1.14E-005 -.324 .746 FCF -1.28E-005 -.368 .713 
INTA .005 .039 .969 INTA -.013 -.100 .920 
NDTS -.013 -.042 .967 NDTS .128 .420 .674 
F – Value 3.994 F – Value 3.662* 
R Square 0.464 R Square 0.459 
* p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.10 
 
Later, this section analyses the influence of firm performance on insider ownership, and its 
definition of insider is limited on managerial share ownership. In this regression model, 
even though both models (Model II – G & H) have a significant F-value that indicates a 
valid model; unfortunately, both exogenous variables of firm performance (Tobin‘s Q and 
ROE) are far from statistically significant results (t-statistic: 0.173 and -0.231, respectively). 
However, the sign of the performance's coefficients is consistent with some previous 
studies, such as Kole (1996) provided related evidence for this conjecture by showing that 
managers prefer equity compensation only when they expect their firms to perform well, 
suggesting that managerial ownership might be endogenous to compensation contracting 
practices. Similarly, Rajagopalan (1996) showed the relationship between executive 
compensation, and performance is contingent upon the firm‘s strategic context. More 
recently, Cho (1998) used the simultaneous equations' estimation technique to show, for 
his sample, that corporate value affected ownership structure, while the reverse 
relationship did not hold. Loderer and Martin (1997) found that acquisition performance 
and firm value affected the size of managers‘ stockholdings but not vice versa in their 
sample of acquisitions. Relatively, this regression result supports the fourth hypothesis. 
 
In order to get more explanatory information in this result, the study explored the 
relationship several control variables used in the model, i.e. PROF, SIZE, and INTA. A 
positively and significant result of PROF (Model II – G & H) is consistent with the study of 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) that produced the first in a series of papers that examine this 
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issue, impose a linear model on the data and find that firm profitability is independent of 
insider ownership (see Table 5).  
 
A negatively and significantly result of SIZE is consistent with the study of Bathala (1996) 
and Pedersen and Thomsen (1999) that state two reasons for a negative effect of size on 
general ownership.  First, due to personal wealth constraints, a large share is easier to 
hold in a small firm. Second, non-diversification costs and liquidity costs increase with size.  
Meanwhile, the statistically significant coefficient of INTA is different from previous studies, 
such as Pindado and de la Torre (2004), which used INTA as a measure for discretionary 
power of management that will favorably influence the extent of insider ownership. This 
result can be interpreted that the level of intangible assets discloses information about a 
firm's growth opportunities and, according to Myers (1977), growth opportunities can be 
viewed as call options whose value depends on discretionary future investment. 
 
Table 5: The Effect of Firm Performance Measures on  
Managerial Share Ownership  











Constant .137 5.718 .000 Constant .136 5.762 .000 
D/E .000 -.037 .970 D/E .000 -.025 .980 
TOBIN Q .001 .173 .863 ROE .000 -.231 .818 
SIZE -.012 -2.814* .005 SIZE -.012 -2.820* .005 
Industry .014 1.141 .255 Industry .014 1.131 .259 
GrowthTA 2.64E-005 .303 .762 GrowthTA 2.58E-005 .296 .767 
PROF .087 1.815*** .070 PROF .086 1.796*** .073 
FCF 1.06E-005 .499 .618 FCF 1.06E-005 .499 .618 
INTA -.165 -2.102** .036 INTA -.165 -2.098** .036 
NDTS -.020 -.103 .918 NDTS -.012 -.063 .950 
F – Value 2.226** F – Value 2.225** 
R Square 0.437 R Square 0.429 
* p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.10 
 
Finally, a positively and significantly relation between leverage and Tobin‘s Q is consistent 
with the incentive signaling approach, which debt can be used to signal the market that 
firm is prospected and equity issues may be interpreted as a negative signal. Ross (1977) 
argues that a firm with better prospects can issue more debt than one with lower 
prospects, because the issue of debt by the latter will result in a higher probability of 
bankruptcy because of debt-servicing costs, which is a pricey outcome to management. 
This result is also consistent with the resource constraints approach, which argues, that in 
the situation, where an entrepreneur has limited resources, then the question of capital 









5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
Generally, the multivariate regression results support the prior empirical findings. In the 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance, a positively and 
significantly relation between EBO and Tobin‘s Q can be interpreted that the East Asian 
companies' large owners are more capable of monitoring and controlling the management, 
thereby contributing to corporate performance. It indicates that ownership concentration 
has been able to increase the cost-efficiency of monitoring in the post-crisis period and 
due to this higher incentive has enhanced its usage. Accordingly, the controlling 
shareholder prefers to increase his utility rather by monitoring than by private benefits. 
 
On the other side, a negatively and significantly influence of managerial ownership at low-
level bears the entrenchment argument. It corroborates that managerial ownership at low-
level has a strong and negative effect on performance and hence should not be promoted 
as the agency device. Meanwhile, a positively and significantly influence of managerial 
ownership at high-level supports the incentive alignment argument. It implies that 
managerial ownership at high-level reduces the conflict of interest between shareholder 
and manager. 
 
Regarding the reverse causality, a positively and significantly influence of Tobin‘s Q on 
EBO can be interpreted that the East Asian companies' large owners are better informed 
than minority shareholders or potential investors, therefore, they use their knowledge 
about the firm‘s prospects to maximize his wealth. This finding is also consistent with the 
profit-debt-ownership argument. Since leverage controls the agency conflicts between 
shareholders and managers, the need for external capital to mediate the conflict 
decreases. Consequently, performance decreases the leverage, which increases the 
ownership concentration. 
 
Meanwhile, in measuring the influence of firm performance on insider ownership, the 
regression model shown statistically insignificant results, even though the model has a 
significant F-value that indicates a valid model. The interesting result in this study is the 
sign of the performance's coefficients that is consistent with some previous studies, such 
as Kole (1996), Rajagopalan (1996), Cho (1998), and Loderer and Martin (1997). Those 
prior studies showed the relationship between executive compensation, and performance 
is contingent upon the firm‘s strategic context, and those supported the idea that corporate 
value affected ownership structure. 
 
The results provide new evidence on the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm performance of East Asian companies in terms of post Asian Financial crisis analysis. 
This research contributes to the literature in at least four important areas. First and most 
important, it can contribute to the literature of determining the effective corporate strategic 
decisions, especially on regarding the ownership structure debate. The practical import is 
that ownership structure is related to the financial efficiency of a firm and hence decisions 
regarding the issue of equity need to consider a range of implications.  
 
Second, the study contributes to the literature on corporate governance fields by 
examining the relationship between external block ownership and managerial share 
ownership, whether it affects the financing decision or not, later to the firm performance. 
Inline to the prior research, the research finds that both external block ownership and 
managerial share ownership affect significantly capital structure and firm performance, as 
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the proxy of the presence of the agency problem. It can give new insight about the effect of 
stock market status, which is emerging and recovering from the last financial crisis.  
 
Fourthly, the course of the analysis has also opened research questions on ownership 
structure and performance, such as the need to explain the negative effect of performance 
and to examine the timing issues. The determination of the ownership structure is an 
object for future research. The consideration of differences in behaviour of stock sales 
versus purchases can clarify the development of ownership structures and their interaction 
with performance and corporate governance. 
 
Finally, the study contributes to the literature of capital structure, ownership structure and 
corporate performance debate in terms of specific event and region by using data that 
covers seven East Asian countries during the period from the 2000 – 2001 to examine 
those companies and its capital structure, ownership structure and corporate performance 
after the Asian Financial crisis. Prior researches in this field generally have relied upon the 
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